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WTO Tariff Commitments and Temporary Protection: Complements or Substitutes?

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Abstract

There is a long-held notion in the trade policy literature that traditional tariff instruments and temporary protection (TP) measures are substitutes. Despite this prediction, there is only mixed empirical evidence for a link between tariff reductions and the usage pattern of antidumping, safeguard and countervailing duties. Based on recent theoretical advances, I argue in this paper that the relevant trade policy margin for implementing TP measures is instead tariff overhangs, the difference between WTO bound and applied tariffs. Lower tariff overhangs constrain countries to raise their MFN applied rates without legal repercussions, independent of past tariff changes. Using detailed sectoral data for a sample of 30 WTO member countries during the period 1996-2014, I find strong evidence for an inverse link between tariff overhangs and TP activity. This result implies that tariff overhangs and TP measures are substitutes, vindicating the importance of existing tariff commitments as a key determinant of alternative protection instruments.

JEL codes: F13, F14, F53

Keywords: GATT/WTO, Temporary Protection, Tariff Overhang

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1 Introduction

The GATT/WTO has been immensely successful in lowering tariff rates through multilateral negotiations.¹ For the initial GATT members, the average MFN applied tariff rate has dropped from 22 percent in 1947 to under 4 percent after the completion of the Uruguay Round in 1994 (Bown and Irwin 2015). Many emerging market and developing economies have also cut their tariffs drastically, from an average of 30 percent in 1980 to 10 percent in 2015 (IMF 2016). Some observers argue, however, that these tariff reductions have come hand in hand with the increased usage of non-tariff barriers and the expansion of unfair trade rules in many advanced and developing WTO member countries (e.g., Bown 2011, Limão and Tovar 2011, and Beverelli et al. 2014), reversing in turn some of the agreement’s welfare gains.² Temporary protection (TP) measures in the form of antidumping (AD), safeguard (SG) and countervailing duties (CVD) are thought to serve in many cases as ‘safety valves’ to satisfy domestic demands for trade barriers in key industries (Hoekman and Kosteci 2009).

While these stylized facts are suggestive, existing cross-country studies have only uncovered mixed empirical evidence for an inverse link between sectoral tariff reductions and TP activity. Feinberg and Reynolds (2007) identify a substitution effect between bound tariff cuts and AD activity, but only in developing economies. Focusing on applied tariff reductions, Moore and Zanardi (2011) find that substitution effects are restricted to the even smaller subset of emerging economies that are heavy AD users. Importantly, none of the cross-country evidence registers an increase in TP activity after tariff cuts in advanced economies, which include some of the most active users of these measures.³ However, recent work by Beshkar and Bond (2017) points out that a separate focus on either applied or bound tariffs misses key features of the WTO agreement. Bound tariffs and provisions that allow for the application of TP measures are alternative means to grant agreement members trade policy flexibility. It follows from this line of research that sectoral tariff overhangs, the difference between WTO bound and applied tariffs, are the relevant indicator for countries who weigh their trade policy options in response to domestic protectionist pressures.

I leverage this insight in this paper and examine the relationship between sectoral tariff overhangs

¹ See Bagwell and Staiger (2002) for a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the GATT/WTO. Ossa (2014) provides a detailed analysis of the associated welfare gains of past multilateral trade negotiations.

² The IMF (2016) documents that the worldwide share of products subject to temporary protection increased from 0.5 percent in 1990 to 2.5 percent in 2015.

³ Focusing on detailed product level data in individual countries, Bown and Tovar (2011) and Ketterer (2016) find that tariff reductions have a positive impact on subsequent TP activity in India and the EU, respectively.

and countries' use of temporary protection measures. If a WTO member's MFN tariff commitments are the primary motivator for implementing additional trade barriers, then sectors with low tariff overhangs should be more likely to experience increased TP activity, independent of past tariff reductions. Intuitively, if sectoral MFN applied tariffs are at or close to their respective bound rates, countries cannot accommodate domestic protectionist demands by adjusting their MFN commitments but have to invoke the agreement's legally sanctioned TP provisions. This notion is also confirmed by a first look at the data for WTO members ([Figure 1](#)). Sectors with lower tariff overhangs witness the subsequent initiation of TP investigations at much higher rates than sectors with more substantial tariff overhangs.

To formally test this hypothesis, I assemble a comprehensive sample of 30 WTO member countries from 1996 to 2014. Using 6-digit sectoral data, I juxtapose at an unprecedented level of detail the impact of tariff overhang pressures and other previously suggested determinants on TP activity. The analysis considers the most common range of TP measures that are invoked as safety valves by WTO members: AD, SG and CVD investigations. This paper therefore makes two major contributions to the literature. First, it constitutes the first empirical analysis of sectoral tariff commitments on general TP activity that considers the relevant trade policy flexibility margin, tariff overhangs. Second, the dataset employed in this study improves on the existing empirical cross-country literature on TP determinants, both in terms of sectoral detail and country coverage.

The empirical evidence confirms that lower tariff overhangs are indeed significant contributors to TP activity across countries and sectors. Tighter WTO tariff commitments induce the usage of TP measures as substitutes to satisfy domestic protectionist demands when applied MFN tariffs cannot be raised. This result is robust across alternative empirical methodologies, and the negative link between tariff overhangs and TP usage is also not driven by sample selection issues, i.e. the presence of low- and high-frequency users of TP practices. Moreover, the inverse relationship between tariff overhangs and TP activity continues to persist after controlling for a host of other potential determinants. An extensive body of research explores the causes and consequences of TP measures, mostly with a focus on antidumping investigations.⁴ In addition to the tariff policy channel discussed above, the existing explanations from cross-country studies can be grouped into four categories: (i) retaliatory motives, (ii) macroeconomic factors, (iii) political economy considerations, and (iv) import competition and terms-of-trade motivations.⁵ Tariff overhangs remain a significant driver of

⁴ Section 2 offers a detailed discussion of this literature and its findings.

⁵ An extensive literature investigates the determinants of import restrictions more generally, mostly with a focus on

TP activity even when accounting for all these factors.

There is a growing literature that has started to analyze the inter-linkages between tariff overhangs and TP proceedings. Focusing on evidence at the country-pair level, [Bown and Crowley \(2014\)](#) find for a sample of 13 major developing economies that a rise in the share of products subject to WTO tariff constraints is associated with an increase in the number of TP measures.⁶ However, Bown and Crowley do not attempt to link actual tariff overhangs to the incidence of TP measures at the sectoral level. [Busch and Pelc \(2014\)](#) examine instead when countries are more likely to rely on unfair trade rules as opposed to raising MFN tariffs, but they do not link tariff overhangs to the prevalence of TP activity itself. More recently, [Beshkar and Bond \(2016\)](#) provide suggestive evidence that sectors with lower tariff overhangs feature a larger number of safeguard actions. However, none of these studies systematically examines the link between WTO members' tariff setting flexibility at the sectoral level, as indicated by sector-specific tariff overhangs, and the use of TP measures. The analysis in this paper fills this void by considering sectoral tariff overhangs as a key constraint for countries when demands for additional import protection arise.

Beyond their link to TP measures, tariff overhangs have recently become a central focus in the trade policy literature. Two main arguments have emerged that attempt to explain the existence of tariff overhangs and rationalize why WTO members prefer the negotiation of bound rather than applied tariff rates. [Horn et al. \(2010\)](#) argue that the presence of non-negligible negotiation costs makes an incomplete agreement with tariff bindings an appealing alternative to applied tariff negotiations which depend on a host of contingencies. [Bagwell and Staiger \(2005\)](#), on the other hand, suggest that governments face time-varying political pressure by domestic lobbying groups which cannot be verified by trading partners. In that case, tariff bindings ensure that countries do not overstate domestic pressures to manipulate the terms of trade in their favor. The latter approach has been extended by [Beshkar and Bond \(2017\)](#) to the case of asymmetric countries and [Amador and Bagwell \(2013\)](#) who provide the general conditions under which an optimal trade agreement takes the form of bound instead of applied tariffs.

In addition to building a theoretical foundation, a number of empirical studies have either examined the determinants of tariff overhangs themselves or their implications for a wide range of economic policies. [Beshkar et al. \(2015\)](#) find that greater import market power is the most relevant

political economy and/or terms-of-trade motives. See, e.g., [Trefler \(1993\)](#), [Goldberg and Maggi \(1999\)](#), [Gawande and Bandyopadhyay \(2000\)](#), [Broda et al. \(2008\)](#), [Bagwell and Staiger \(2011\)](#), and [Gawande et al. \(2015\)](#).

⁶ [Bown and Crowley \(2013b\)](#) find no evidence that the same measure is significant in a sample of five advanced economies.

driver of low tariff overhangs.⁷ [Handley \(2014\)](#) provides evidence that greater tariff overhangs increase trade policy uncertainty which in turn delays the entry of exporters and trade growth. Most closely related to the empirical mechanism exploited in this paper is the work by [Kuenzel \(2017\)](#). His study provides evidence that WTO members with low tariff overhangs are more likely to become involved in WTO disputes as applied tariffs close to WTO bindings restrict countries' legal policy options when demands for protection arise.

The next section offers a detailed discussion of the theory and empirical evidence for the different channels that have been suggested as determinants of TP measures. Section 3 introduces the empirical model and discusses the data. Section 4 provides empirical evidence for the link between tariff overhangs and TP proceedings, and section 5 considers several extensions of the baseline framework. Section 6 concludes.

2 Temporary Protection Determinants

An extensive literature has emerged on the determinants of temporary protection, which refers to tariff barriers that are imposed for a limited time on specific goods and/or countries in excess of WTO-negotiated duties on imports. More specifically, as noted by [Bown and Crowley \(2013b, p. 51\)](#), TP measures are “the relatively substitutable import restrictions under antidumping, countervailing duty, global safeguards, and the China-specific safeguard policies.” I follow this notion below, and use the term ‘temporary protection’ to include all of these measures. While the nature of AD, SG and CVD investigations is not always identical, they serve a common purpose: legally-sanctioned additional protection for specific products and industries that originate from certain countries.⁸ This section lays out why the WTO’s MFN tariff structure itself is likely to be an important driver of TP actions. In addition, I discuss other determinants of TP proceedings that have been suggested in the literature.

2.1 Trade Policy

There is a widely accepted notion that constraining tariffs through trade agreements incentivizes countries to instead seek protection through unfair trade rules provisions and non-tariff barriers

⁷ Focusing on a related mechanism, [Nicita et al. \(forthcoming\)](#) provide evidence that market power and applied tariffs are positively correlated in the absence of cooperation between countries, i.e. when tariff overhangs are positive and the WTO agreement is non-binding, while the reverse holds when tariffs are set cooperatively.

⁸ Nevertheless, the majority of the TP literature focuses on antidumping investigations as AD cases tend to be observed more frequently due to a stricter burden of proof in SG and CVD proceedings.

(NTBs). In a survey of the early literature on non-tariff measures, [Baldwin \(1984\)](#) notes that the application of unfair trade practices in the form of quantitative restrictions, subsidies and dumping has risen as governments have successfully lowered their tariffs through multilateral negotiations. Several theoretical explanations have been put forward to make sense of this phenomenon. [Copeland \(1990\)](#) argues that this substitution towards less efficient NTBs will emerge if loopholes exist in trade agreements due to non-negotiable trade barriers. Incomplete agreements which culminate in NTBs could, for instance, arise in the presence of uncertainty and asymmetric information ([Hungerford 1991](#)). Moreover, governments might be particularly inclined to substitute NTBs for tariffs if they value contributions from special interest groups ([Yu 2000](#)). The importance of domestic lobbying pressures is also emphasized by [Limão and Tovar \(2011\)](#) who show that governments have an incentive to use less efficient NTBs when tariff constraints serve as a commitment device toward special interest groups. [Anderson and Schmitt \(2003\)](#) take instead a more general approach and derive how the choice of a country's preferred trade policy instrument (tariff, quota, AD duty) varies with trade costs and the government welfare function.

Focusing on the GATT/WTO environment, [Ederington \(2001\)](#) finds that in the presence of limited enforcement flexible trade barriers, such as safeguards, are the most efficient means for countries to ensure the viability of the agreement. At the same time, [Bagwell and Staiger \(2001\)](#) argue that, at least in theory, the WTO is well equipped to function as a forum to negotiate different levels of market access through a combination of tariffs and domestic NTBs. However, in a more recent review of the state of NTBs, [Ederington and Ruta \(2016\)](#) observe that multilateral trade negotiations might be better able to deal with terms-of-trade distortions from tariff choices, while coordination failures with regard to other measures could be more easily addressed in smaller forums such as preferential trade agreements.

As noted in the introduction, several empirical studies follow this notion from the theoretical literature and examine whether tariffs and TP measures are indeed interchangeable.⁹ While the literature identifies a substitution effect for several developing countries, the results are more elusive for advanced economies. But focusing purely on tariff reductions and TP actions misses a crucial margin in a country's decision to pursue unfair trade investigations. Tariff cuts should only lead to more TP activity if they leave a country's MFN applied tariffs at or close to its negotiated tariff

⁹ For a sample of developing countries, [Moore and Zanardi \(2009\)](#) find no evidence that AD actions themselves induce more trade liberalization. According to [Kuczik and Reinhardt \(2008\)](#), however, the presence of AD laws alone could be associated with lower WTO bound rates.

bindings. [Figure 1](#) presents stylized evidence in support of this point. 6-digit sectors with a zero tariff overhang are nearly five times more likely to witness the initiation of a TP investigation in the subsequent year than sectors with a tariff overhang of more than 40 percentage points.

In addition to the empirical evidence in [Figure 1](#), recent theoretical advances in the trade policy literature also point toward a link between tariff overhangs and TP activity. [Beshkar et al. \(2015\)](#) document that demands for trade policy flexibility can explain the observed differences between WTO applied tariffs and bindings. In subsequent work, [Beshkar and Bond \(2017\)](#) analyze how tariff bindings and TP measures are alternative options to satisfy these flexibility demands. [Kuenzel \(2017\)](#) takes this analysis one step further and develops a theoretical basis for the link between tariff overhangs and TP actions in the context of WTO disputes. In his framework, after being subject to exogenous shocks, WTO members have an increased incentive to apply temporary protection or non-tariff barriers when their applied tariff is close to or at the tariff binding. If trading partners perceive at least some of these measures as unjustified, an inverse link should emerge between tariff overhangs and the incidence of WTO disputes, a prediction which is borne out by the data. The same logic applies in the present context. When domestic demands for protection arise (e.g., due to productivity shocks, import surges or business cycle downturns), a lower tariff overhang increases the incentive for countries to implement additional import barriers via AD, CVD or SG proceedings. Hence, these recent papers suggest that tariff overhangs and TP measures serve as substitutes for countries to achieve their desired level of protection.

Nevertheless, it is possible that even in the presence of large tariff overhangs countries prefer the usage of AD, SG or CVD measures. One major advantage of TP instruments is that they can be applied in a discriminatory and thus more targeted fashion than MFN applied tariffs. [Blonigen and Prusa \(2016\)](#) also make the point that AD duties (or SGs and CVDs) allow governments to establish a higher cost threshold for firms and other interest groups to exert political pressure for protection. If these motivations dominate, WTO tariff overhangs and TP measures could also function as complements rather than substitutes. Whether lower tariff overhangs contribute to the incidence of TP actions is then an empirical question. While the stylized facts in [Figure 1](#) and the theoretical channels are suggestive, a formal empirical analysis is required to determine if tighter sectoral WTO tariff commitments are a significant decision margin for TP activity. Moreover, the omission of the tariff overhang channel could lead to biased estimates for many of the previously suggested determinants of temporary protection, in particular tariff reductions. Before laying out an appropriate empirical strategy, I next briefly review other previously suggested TP determinants.

2.2 Retaliation

A growing strand of the literature analyzes to what extent TP activity is due to retaliatory motives, also known as “echoing.” Focusing on Europe and the US, [Maur \(1998\)](#) first demonstrated the substantial correlation in the industry selection of AD actions across countries. Taking a more structured approach, subsequent studies empirically confirmed this pattern. Examining more countries and longer time series, [Prusa and Skeath \(2002, 2005\)](#), [Feinberg and Reynolds \(2006, 2008\)](#) and [Bao and Qiu \(2011\)](#) all find that tit-for-tat retaliation is a significant determinant of AD proceedings. In the most recent analysis of antidumping echoing, [Tabakis and Zanardi \(2017a\)](#) document the importance of retaliatory motives for AD actions at a previously unmatched sectoral level of detail (HS 4-digit). Moreover, they provide a theoretical framework to explain the incidence of echoing. It follows from this line of research that countries, at least in part, use AD investigations and tariffs as potential deterrent to make future TP measures against their own exporters more costly.

2.3 Macroeconomic Factors

Several studies also suggest that macroeconomic factors have an impact on TP activity. Focusing on Australia, Canada, the EU and the US, [Knetter and Prusa \(2003\)](#) show that lower GDP growth and real exchange rate appreciations lead to more filings of AD petitions over the period 1980-1998.¹⁰ Examining the same set of countries plus South Korea from 1988 to 2010, [Bown and Crowley \(2013b\)](#) confirm the inverse relationship between all types of TP measures (AD, SG, CVD) and the business cycle of the importing as well as exporting countries. Bown and Crowley also find that exchange rate appreciations lead to more TP investigations. In a follow-up study, [Bown and Crowley \(2014\)](#) present similar evidence for an inverse relationship between macroeconomic shocks and TP restrictions in thirteen major emerging economies. Earlier work by [Bown \(2008\)](#) likewise identifies a significant relationship with negative macroeconomic shocks when confining the analysis to AD activity and developing economies. Aside from cross-country studies, a number of papers also link macroeconomic conditions to TP usage rates in individual countries; see [Niels and Francois \(2006\)](#) for Mexico and [Crowley \(2011\)](#) for the US.

¹⁰ In earlier work, [Feinberg \(1989\)](#) finds that US Dollar depreciations lead to more US firm filings that allege dumping and/or foreign subsidies. However, as pointed out by [Knetter and Prusa \(2003\)](#), the theoretical link between exchange rates and the incentive to implement temporary protection is actually ambiguous.

2.4 Political Economy Motives

Starting with [Finger et al. \(1982\)](#), there is a rich earlier literature that focuses on the political economy of temporary protection and in particular antidumping activities across industries, mostly in the US context. Industry size and structure, poor performance and greater political leverage frequently emerge as significant determinants from these studies. [Hansen \(1990\)](#), for instance, identifies firm employment, pressure groups and the location of industries in districts of powerful politicians as AD petition and decision determinants. [Hoekman and Leidy \(1992\)](#) argue that the availability of TP measures in downstream industries might induce upstream firms to seek additional protection out of indirect rent-seeking behavior. [Feinberg and Kaplan \(1993\)](#) provide empirical evidence for this cascading effect of temporary protection in the US metal and chemical industries. Focusing on antidumping filings by US firms, [Blonigen \(2006\)](#) also finds evidence that prior experience with the temporary protection process leads to greater subsequent filing activity and a higher likelihood of affirmative decisions for firm petitions.

2.5 Import Surges and Terms-of-trade Effects

The last strand of the literature links TP activity to sectoral imports and terms-of-trade motives based on the ‘managed trade’ theory by [Bagwell and Staiger \(1990\)](#). Bagwell and Staiger suggest that countries have an incentive to implement additional protection during periods of import surges. Moreover, increases in trade barriers after import surges should lead to greater terms-of-trade gains in sectors with lower import demand and export supply elasticities, implying fewer distortions in the domestic economy after a tariff hike. [Bown and Crowley \(2013a\)](#) test this prediction with a focus on US import policy during 1997-2006 and indeed confirm a positive relation between import growth and the probability that the US imposes an AD tariff. [Bown \(2008\)](#) also offers empirical evidence that developing countries which face substantial import competition and more rapidly declining industry output are more active AD users. However, in light of the above discussion on the counter-cyclical impact of macroeconomic factors on TP actions, the relation between import growth and the incidence of TP measures is not necessarily clear-cut. As business cycle downturns are associated with overall decreases in imports, it is also possible that import growth and TP activity are inversely linked. Examining data on monthly US sectoral imports, [Hillberry and McCalman \(2016\)](#) confirm this notion as they find that negative import demand shocks tend to directly precede the filing of AD petitions. Hence, depending on whether macroeconomic factors or trade policy

considerations dominate, the impact of import growth on TP investigations is ambiguous.

In addition to the trade policy channels, the empirical analysis below will account for all TP determinants laid out in this part. The next section presents the empirical framework that allows us to juxtapose the impact of tariff overhangs and other factors on TP activity across countries and sectors over time.

3 Empirical Approach

To test whether tariff overhangs and TP measures are substitutes or complements, I implement two empirical strategies. First, a fixed effects logit model is employed to estimate the impact of sectoral tariff overhangs on the probability of the initiation of a TP investigation. Second, I use a linear probability model to examine the robustness of the findings from the logit estimation. The latter is crucial as the presence of many fixed effects can potentially induce biased marginal effect estimates in non-linear panel models; see [Greene \(2002, 2008\)](#) for a discussion. However, simulation studies also indicate that the bias is limited if the length of the panel is not too short ([Katz 2001](#), [Greene 2004](#), and [Coupé 2005](#)).

3.1 Model

As the main variable of interest, MFN tariff overhangs, varies by importer, year and sector, the empirical analysis focuses on the same aggregation level. For both the logit and linear probability models, I estimate the following baseline specification:

$$TP_{ict} = \beta \text{Overhang}_{ic,t-1} + \gamma Z_{ic,t-1} + \eta_s + \omega_{ct} + \epsilon_{ict} \quad (1)$$

where TP_{ict} is a binary variable that takes the value one if temporary protection proceedings are initiated in the 6-digit sector i in country c in year t , and zero otherwise.¹¹ The definition of TP proceedings includes AD, SG and CVD investigations. In place of TP investigations, I also consider below as dependent variable the incidence of actually implemented TP tariffs. The results are similar in both cases, which probably is not too surprising as 73 percent of the observed TP investigations in the sample eventually result in additional import barriers. The main variable of

¹¹ In the robustness section, I also consider count data models which exploit the variation in the actual number of products and countries in each 6-digit HS sector that are potentially affected by TP investigations.

interest in specification (1) is the sectoral tariff overhang:

$$Overhang_{ic,t-1} = Tariff_{ic,t-1}^{Bound} - Tariff_{ic,t-1}^{Applied}, \quad (2)$$

which captures the difference between a country’s MFN bound and applied tariff rates at the 6-digit level in a given year. When a lower tariff overhang in sector i raises the likelihood to initiate TP proceedings for this product, then we should expect $\beta < 0$. In that case, TP measures would substitute for a rise in the MFN applied tariff. On the other hand, if β is not significantly different from zero or even positive, TP measures and MFN tariff overhangs rather function as complements. Note that in order to control for information delays, I include one period lagged values of all independent variables in the empirical model in equation (1).

The vector Z contains a number of control variables that either could exert a direct impact on the initiation of TP proceedings or which have been shown in the literature to be determinants of tariff overhangs themselves. First and foremost, to capture import penetration and market power considerations, I include a country’s sectoral imports in a given year (in logs), $\log(Imports_{ict})$, and its sectoral share in world imports (in logs), $\log(WorldImportShare_{ict})$. Moreover, I account in all specifications for the sectoral share of imports from a country’s preferential trade agreement partners, $PTAImportShare_{ict}$, as MFN tariffs could be a less important margin for TP demands when most imports of a given product enter a nation on more beneficial terms. Countries might also be less willing to grant multilateral tariff concessions in sectors with a high share of imports from PTA partners. The latter two variables have previously been shown to be significant determinants of tariff overhangs themselves (Beshkar et al. 2015).

In addition, the model includes country-year fixed effects, ω_{ct} , which capture potential macroeconomic determinants of TP investigations, such as exchange rates and economic growth, as well as political economy considerations and other determinants that vary at the country-year level. To account for industry-specific drivers of demand for import protection, the estimations below also include 2-digit HS sector fixed effects, η_s . Additional controls, in particular the TP determinants surveyed in the previous section, are discussed and introduced in passing below.

3.2 Data

To examine the link between TP proceedings and tariff overhangs, I draw on information from two sources. Data on TP investigations come from the World Bank’s Temporary Trade Barriers

Database (Bown 2007). The TTBD database provides detailed information on initiated antidumping, safeguard and countervailing duty investigations. Most importantly, it contains country-specific information on the timing and in which sectors TP demands arise. In the empirical analysis below, I use information on all countries that can be matched to MFN bound and applied tariff rates from the World Bank’s TRAINS database. As the most detailed available tariff data in TRAINS is in 6-digit HS terms, I aggregate the information in the TTBD database up to that level if the cited HS sector is available at a more disaggregate code (e.g., 8 or 10 digits). To create the tariff overhang variable at the 6-digit HS level, I subtract the applied MFN tariff rate from the MFN bound rate. The average sectoral tariff overhang in the full sample is 14.30 percent and also shows substantial variation with a standard deviation of 17.47 percent (see Table 2 for detailed summary statistics).¹²

Table 1 provides an overview of the total number of 6-digit HS sectors for each country in the sample, the corresponding count of sectors with at least one initiated TP investigation (differentiated by AD, SG and CVD measures), and the country-specific distribution of tariff overhangs across sectors. The empirical analysis below focuses on the time period 1996-2014 which constitutes the intersection between both the TRAINS tariff data and the available information on temporary protection proceedings in the TTBD database. The final dataset includes data on MFN tariff overhangs and temporary protection proceedings in 30 countries.

Table 1 shows that the use of TP measures in the dataset varies substantially between countries, both in terms of quantity and the usage pattern across the different measures (AD, SG or CVD). The EU, India, Peru and the US initiated the most TP investigations during the sample period, with more than 500 affected 6-digit sectors each.¹³ Argentina follows closely in terms of frequency. Jamaica, Japan, Paraguay and Trinidad and Tobago, on the other hand, are the least active countries in the sample in terms of TP frequency with fewer than 10 investigations each.¹⁴ Overall, AD investigations are the most popular tool to implement TP measures with Chile, Ecuador, the Philippines and Venezuela being notable exceptions. In these countries, 6-digit sectors with SG

¹² Note that sectoral tariff overhangs do not necessarily have to be positive. Tariff overhangs at the 6-digit HS level can be negative for at least three reasons: 1. No bindings are set for certain sub-sectors (which can bias the 6-digit average bound rate), 2. after negotiating new bound rates, WTO members are usually granted phase-in periods during which applied tariffs can exceed the new tariff bindings, and 3. the presence of non-tariff barriers might bias the calculation of tariff overhangs due to the necessary conversion into ad valorem equivalents. To avoid the last issue, I do not consider non-tariff measures in the tariff overhang calculations. However, the estimates are not qualitatively affected by this choice. Results which include non-tariff measure equivalents are available on request.

¹³ In contrast to the other countries, a large share of Peru’s TP investigations is concentrated in relatively few industries and years (apparel, HS chapters 61 and 62, in 2004 and 2012). The results below are robust to excluding these cases.

¹⁴ The estimates below are virtually identical when excluding countries with single-digit TP usage frequency. Detailed results are available upon request.

investigations outweigh the number of AD probes.

The right panel of [Table 1](#) reports the tariff overhang distribution for each country using the same categories as in [Figure 1](#). The data shows that there is substantial variation in MFN tariff setting flexibility across the WTO members in the sample. Four countries (China, EU, Japan, US) feature very tight tariff overhangs across the board as they have set their applied MFN tariffs at the respective bound rate in over 90 percent of import sectors. On the other hand, four countries are barely restricted by their bound tariff commitments: Costa Rica, Jamaica, Pakistan, and Trinidad and Tobago have tariff overhangs of more than 40 percent for over half of all products. The remaining 22 countries in the sample fall between these two extremes. For the latter group (except Canada), the vast majority of import sectors features tariff overhangs between 0 and 40 percent. To ensure that the results below are not driven by specific country groups, the empirical analysis will examine various subsamples of the data.

In addition to the temporary protection and tariff data, we require information on sectoral trade volumes and preferential trading relationships. Trade data at the 6-digit HS level is obtained from Comtrade, while information on bilateral PTA memberships over time comes from [de Sousa \(2012\)](#). [Table 2](#) provides summary statistics, definitions and data sources for all variables used in the analysis below.

4 Baseline Results

This section presents the baseline results of the empirical model outlined in equation (1). I first obtain estimates using a logit framework, and subsequently consider a linear probability model to examine the robustness of the findings. [Table 3](#) shows the average marginal effect estimates from logit regressions of the binary TP indicator on the sectoral tariff overhang measure and additional control variables. Standard errors (clustered at the country/2-digit HS level) are reported in parentheses.

Column (1) in [Table 3](#) considers the most parsimonious specification, which only includes the tariff overhang variable in addition to the country-year and 2-digit HS industry fixed effects. The tariff overhang coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level, indicating that a greater tariff overhang in a given sector lowers the probability of initiating a TP investigation. Based on this result, tariff overhangs and TP measures appear to be substitutes. The coefficient of -0.0059 implies that, on average, an increase in the sectoral tariff overhang from 0 to 22 percentage

points, which corresponds to a move from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the data, lowers the probability for the initiation of TP proceedings by .13 percentage points ($= .22 \times (-.0059) \times 100$). As the unconditional probability for a TP investigation in a given sector and year is .42 percent in the sample, the magnitude of the estimate implies a substantial economic impact of tariff overhangs on the number of newly implemented TP measures.

Column (2) introduces the three additional TP and tariff overhang determinants that were discussed in section 3: $\log(\text{Imports})$, PTAImportShare and $\log(\text{WorldImportShare})$. The tariff overhang estimate remains stable and highly statistically significant after including these variables. Two of the newly introduced control variables also show significant effects. First, the volume of sectoral imports, $\log(\text{Imports})$, has a significant positive impact on the probability that a TP investigation is initiated. This result indicates that TP measures are more likely to benefit domestic producers in sectors with greater import competition. Second, we detect a significant effect of the share in sectoral world imports, $\log(\text{WorldImportShare})$, which captures a country's market power to influence world prices with its trade policy actions. As is well known, the sectoral world import share is inversely related to the foreign export supply elasticity that a country faces (see, e.g., [Beshkar et al. 2015](#)). TP proceedings should be more appealing when countries have more market power to influence the terms of trade in their favor. However, the estimate in column (2) suggests that a greater world import share actually reduces the likelihood of TP measures. The reason for this surprising result lies in the fact that part of the market power effect is already captured by the import volumes term. When omitting the $\log(\text{Imports})$ term in specification (3), the $\log(\text{WorldImportShare})$ coefficient indeed turns positive and is also significant at the one percent level. Thus, greater sectoral market power indeed makes TP investigations more probable. Below I also consider sectoral import growth and the import demand elasticity as additional TP determinants to fully account for terms-of-trade motives. The estimated tariff overhang effects are not affected by the omission of these variables.

The sectoral import share from PTA partners in specifications (2) and (3) has no statistically significant impact on the likelihood of TP measures. Column (4) further investigates the relationship between import shares from PTA partners, tariff overhangs and TP investigations. In particular, I introduce an interaction between the Overhang and the PTAImportShare terms to examine whether the tariff overhang channel is less pronounced for sectors in which countries import a greater share from PTA partners who are supposedly not subject to MFN tariffs. While the positive coefficient of the interaction points in that direction, the effect is not statistically significant. At the same

time, the tariff overhang coefficient slightly increases in magnitude but is estimated less precisely.¹⁵ I also examined whether the tariff overhang coefficient is affected by the share of sectoral imports entering under unilateral GSP provisions. When including a GSP import share measure and the corresponding interaction with the tariff overhang variable, the estimate is nearly identical to column (4) – detailed results are available upon request. Thus, the empirical evidence indicates that the tariff overhang channel operates independently of preferential trading relationships. More generally, preferential trade deals also seem not to lower the frequency of TP investigations.¹⁶

Specifications (5) to (7) in [Table 3](#) examine whether tariff overhang pressures have a differential impact on AD versus CVD and SG investigations. This question is of particular interest as most of the literature focuses squarely on the determinants of AD proceedings while neglecting other unfair trade protection measures. Column (5) considers on the left hand side an indicator variable that takes the value one if a country launches one or more antidumping investigations ($AD_{ict} = 1$) in a given sector and year, and zero otherwise ($AD_{ict} = 0$). In contrast, columns (6) and (7) replace the TP indicator with binary variables that take the value one if at least one CVD or SG investigation is initiated, respectively, and zero otherwise. Note that the sample size shrinks in all cases compared to specifications (1) to (4) as the logit regressions drop all observations which are perfectly predicted by the included fixed effects. That is, observations at the country-year and 2-digit sectoral level are omitted if they show no variation in the dependent variable, i.e. never initiated or always initiated TP investigations. More observations are dropped in columns (6) and (7) due to the fact that CVD and SG investigations are in general rarer than their AD counterparts (see [Table 1](#) and [Table 2](#)).

Two interesting results emerge in columns (5) through (7). First, the tariff overhang coefficients are negative in all cases, mirroring the baseline TP specification in column (2). Thus, even when differentiating between AD and other TP measures that have received less attention in the literature, the estimates reveal the same inverse relation with tariff overhangs. Less available flexibility in the setting of MFN tariffs induces countries to adopt WTO-sanctioned TP measures as suitable policy substitutes. Second, only in the case of the AD indicator the tariff overhang estimate is as highly significant as in the baseline specification in (2). While the negative signs are indicative in columns (6) and (7), the tariff overhang channel only remains statistically significant (at the 10 percent level) for CVD investigations. One possible explanation for the latter result is the considerable smaller

¹⁵ The tariff overhang coefficient also remains stable when excluding all TP investigations that target PTA partners and their respective trade volumes. Detailed results are available upon request.

¹⁶ In recent work, [Tabakis and Zanardi \(2017b\)](#) find that the negotiation and implementation of PTAs lead to fewer AD measures against non-member countries, indicating a building block effect of preferential trade agreements.

number of observed SG and CVD actions compared to AD investigations, which is likely to lead to less precise coefficient estimates in these specifications compared to the AD regression in column (5). In any case, the results show that greater tariff overhangs significantly ease the pressure on launching either AD or CVD investigations, while the evidence for SG measures is more mixed.

Finally, specifications (8) and (9) in [Table 3](#) consider the relationship between tariff overhangs and TP investigations at more aggregate levels. Instead of conducting the estimation at the 6-digit HS level, column (8) matches average tariff overhangs and binary TP indicators by 2-digit codes. The 2-digit level aggregates the 6-digit information from around 5,000 sectors to 97 industries.¹⁷ Column (9) repeats a less stringent aggregation exercise to the 4-digit HS level, which conforms to around 1,200 sectors. In both the 2-digit and 4-digit level specifications, the tariff overhang coefficient is again negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. Hence, even at more aggregate levels we observe that lower sectoral tariff overhangs induce more TP investigations.

Nonetheless, there are also two differences that emerge compared to the baseline 6-digit level results in column (2). First, in the 2-digit specification in column (8), the signs for both $\log(\text{Imports})$ and $\log(\text{WorldImportShare})$ are reversed, indicating that with aggregate data the world import share variable is more successful in capturing both a country's market power and the level of benefits accruing to domestic producers from TP measures. Second, the magnitude of the tariff overhang coefficient increases with the level of aggregation, which is line with expectations as the sectoral prevalence of TP investigations rises when conducting the analysis at the 2- and 4-digit levels.

To examine the robustness of the logit estimates, [Table 4](#) presents results using instead a fixed effects linear probability model. Columns (10) to (18) in [Table 4](#) replicate the earlier specifications from [Table 3](#). The tariff overhang coefficients are negative throughout and statistically significant (mostly at the one percent level), except again for the SG subsample in column (16). The tariff overhang coefficients from the linear model do not only match the signs and significance levels of the earlier results in [Table 3](#) but are also similar in magnitude to the average marginal effect estimates from the logit model. Thus, the linear probability model results confirm the earlier findings: Sectoral tariff overhangs and TP measures function as substitutes.

With regard to the remaining control variables, a similar overlap in results emerges between [Table 3](#) and [Table 4](#). Sectoral imports, $\log(\text{Imports})$, are still estimated to have a significant positive effect on the initiation of TP proceedings while a significant negative link is detected for the world

¹⁷ The exact number of 6-digit HS sectors depends on the HS nomenclature in use which is frequently updated over the years.

import share, $\log(\text{WorldImportShare})$. As in the logit case, the 2-digit HS estimates in column (17) are again an exception to this trend. In line with the previous results, the PTAImportShare coefficient is not statistically significant in most of the specifications, indicating again no systematic relationship between preferential trading concessions and the use of TP measures.

Note that for ease of comparison, specifications (10) to (18) consider the exact same sample composition as in the logit setup in [Table 3](#). However, as previously mentioned, the logit estimations drop all observations which lack sufficient variation in the dependent variable as these realizations are perfectly explained by the included fixed effects. To make sure that the tariff overhang estimate is not driven by sample selection issues, specification (19) in [Table 4](#) reports results that also include all observations that were dropped by the logit model. The expanded sample exceeds the baseline specification in column (11) by 702,071 observations. The pattern of the coefficient estimates in the larger sample matches the earlier results. While the coefficient magnitude slightly decreases, the tariff overhang variable retains a highly significant negative effect on the initiation of TP proceedings. Thus, specification (19) confirms that the earlier results are not driven by the sample selection of the fixed effects logit model.

5 Extensions

Having offered strong support for the hypothesis that MFN tariff overhangs and TP measures function as substitutes and not complements, this section considers four extensions of the baseline model. In particular, the analysis below (i) considers the robustness of the results when excluding potentially crucial subsamples, (ii) controls for additional determinants of TP proceedings suggested in the literature, (iii) examines the relationship of tariff overhangs and the incidence of actually implemented TP tariffs, and (iv) exploits the information on the actual number of sectoral and country-specific TP investigations via count data models.

5.1 Subsample Results

[Table 1](#) shows that the number of initiated TP proceedings varies substantially between countries. The frequency of TP investigations in the sample ranges from two affected 6-digit HS sectors for Paraguay to 858 for Peru. To ensure that the tariff overhang effects identified above are not driven by specific country groups, I exclude different subsamples from the empirical analysis in [Table 5](#).

Let us first consider the possibility that the previous results could be affected by countries which

initiate relatively few TP proceedings and thus pose an increased risk of introducing outliers into the analysis. Using the baseline logit model from column (2) in [Table 3](#), specifications (20) to (22) in [Table 5](#) report results when I successively remove countries that feature the lowest count of TP investigations (see [Table 1](#)). Column (20) discards all countries from the sample with 25 or fewer initiated TP proceedings. Columns (21) and (22) further restrict the sample by eliminating countries with fewer than 75 and 150 6-digit sectors that have been subject to new TP measures, respectively. Three results emerge from specifications (20) to (22). First, tariff overhangs remain a highly significant negative determinant of TP investigations even after excluding countries with a relatively low incidence of cases. Second, the average marginal effect of tariff overhangs rises with the successive exclusion of countries that feature a low count of sectors with TP proceedings, which we should expect as the share of sectors with TP measures in the sample increases. Third, the conclusions with regard to all other control variables remain unchanged. Columns (24) to (26) in [Table 5](#) report the corresponding results when I employ instead a linear probability model framework. The magnitude and significance pattern for all estimates is again very similar to the logit results. Hence, independent of the estimation approach, tariff overhangs remain a highly significant negative predictor of TP proceedings even after excluding potential outliers in countries that are less inclined to use such measures.

It is, of course, an equally valid concern that the substitution effect between tariff overhangs and TP activity is driven by heavy users of such measures. In the baseline sample, four countries feature more than 500 TP investigations each: India, Peru, the European Union, and the United States.¹⁸ At the same time, it is well-documented that both the US and the EU have, on average, low sectoral tariff overhangs while a robust inverse relationship between tariff cuts and TP usage has been reported for India.¹⁹ Hence, to rule out that the above results are driven by very active TP users, column (23) in [Table 5](#) provides logit estimates of the baseline specification when these four countries are excluded from the sample. While slightly decreasing in magnitude, the tariff overhang coefficient remains negative and significant at the one percent level. The inverse relationship between tariff overhangs and TP investigations is not driven by the heavy users of these measures.²⁰ This

¹⁸ Documentation on the frequent use of TP measures in these countries is also provided by, amongst others, [Knetter and Prusa \(2003\)](#), [Feinberg and Reynolds \(2007\)](#), [Moore and Zanardi \(2011\)](#), and [Blonigen and Prusa \(2016\)](#).

¹⁹ See [Beshkar et al. \(2015\)](#), [Kuenzel \(2017\)](#) as well as [Table 1](#) for the prevalence of low tariff overhangs in the US and the EU. [Bown and Tovar \(2011\)](#) link tariff reductions in India to subsequent surges in TP activity.

²⁰ The results are nearly identical when only the EU and the US are excluded. Tariff overhangs also retain their significant negative impact on the incidence of TP investigations when one distinguishes between advanced and developing economies. Detailed estimates are available upon request.

conclusion is also confirmed by the linear probability model estimates in column (27). As the linear probability model results show consistently the same pattern, the remainder of the paper only reports average marginal effects using the logit specifications. The results for the corresponding linear models are throughout qualitatively similar and available upon request.

5.2 Accounting for Additional TP Determinants

As discussed in Section 2, the theoretical and empirical literature suggests a number of alternative drivers of TP measures and in particular AD investigations. In this part, I focus on four major channels that are frequently considered in previous studies: (i) import surges and terms-of-trade motives, (ii) tariff rate changes, (iii) retaliation concerns, and (iv) sectoral political economy concerns.²¹ The results below show that sectoral tariff overhangs remain a significant driver of TP proceedings even after controlling for these factors.

Beginning with [Bagwell and Staiger \(1990\)](#), a ‘managed trade’ literature has emerged that links periods with unexpected import surges to additional protectionist demands during such times. To examine whether the tariff overhang estimates are sensitive to this channel, column (28) in [Table 6](#) adds the 3-year change in log sectoral imports (at the 6-digit HS level) to the baseline logit specification, which captures both short- and medium-term trends in sectoral imports. The results are qualitatively similar with one-year changes (available on request). When accounting for sectoral import growth, the tariff overhang coefficient remains negative and significant at the one percent level. In fact, the magnitude of the estimated average marginal effect on TP investigations even increases. At the same time, import growth itself has no significant impact on the likelihood of TP proceedings. More generally, the estimates from specification (28) provide evidence that after controlling for sectoral import levels in the form of $\log(\text{Imports})$ and $\log(\text{WorldImportShare})$, there is little room for import growth as a separate determinant of TP proceedings. This finding is in line with [Prusa and Skeath \(2005\)](#) who find that while big exporters are more likely to be subject to AD actions, import surges are not associated with more AD filings. One potential explanation for this result is that import surges can be driven by both foreign supply or domestic demand shocks which renders an ambiguous effect on domestic protectionist demands. Most importantly, however, the substitution effect between tariff overhangs and TP measures is once more confirmed.

²¹ Note that the presence of country-year and industry fixed effects prevents the separate inclusion of a number of potential macroeconomic and industry-specific determinants suggested in the literature, such as unemployment, the business cycle, or exchange rates. See [Bown and Crowley \(2013b\)](#) for a discussion.

Bown and Crowley (2013a) emphasize that terms-of-trade gains after implementing temporary trade barriers are greater in sectors with lower import and export supply elasticities. While $\log(\text{WorldImportShare})$ already functions as a proxy for the (inverse) sectoral world export supply elasticity, column (29) also introduces as additional TP determinant the sectoral inverse import demand elasticity. Import demand elasticities at the 6-digit HS level are obtained from Kee et al. (2008) and augmented by the 3-digit level estimates in Broda et al. (2008) if the former is not available. The introduction of the import demand elasticity measure does not affect the inverse relationship between tariff overhangs and TP investigations. At the same time, the inverse import demand elasticity itself has no significant impact. Thus, even after controlling for terms-of-trade motives, tariff overhangs and temporary protection measures remain substitutes.

As previously discussed, several papers in the literature have considered the question whether WTO members are more likely to implement non-tariff barriers and/or TP measures after larger tariff reductions (e.g., Feinberg and Reynolds, 2007, Moore and Zanardi, 2011, and Ketterer, 2016). The logit specification in column (30) of Table 6 therefore introduces as an additional control variable the 3-year change in the 6-digit HS sector’s applied tariff rate, which again captures both short- and medium term effects of tariff changes. The results with one-year tariff changes are similar (and available on request). Column (30) shows that tariff adjustments have, on average, no significant effect on the probability of subsequent TP proceedings. Even though the sample size drops due to the inclusion of the change in the applied tariff rate, the estimated average marginal effects for the remaining variables, including the tariff overhang channel, are comparable to the baseline logit specification in column (2) of Table 3. After accounting for changes in sectoral tariff rates, tariff overhangs remain a highly significant negative driver of TP investigations.²²

Another channel that the literature has suggested to explain the observed pattern of TP investigations is retaliatory motives (e.g., Maur 1998, Prusa and Skeath 2002, Feinberg and Reynolds 2006, and Tabakis and Zanardi 2017a). To further examine the robustness of the earlier results, columns (31) to (33) in Table 6 consider a number of different proxies for potentially retaliatory motives when setting up TP measures. The literature defines a TP investigation as potentially retaliatory if a trade partner recently initiated similar proceedings targeting the same or a similar product. Column (31) defines retaliatory motives in a relatively broad fashion. The binary variable

²² The same conclusion holds when considering changes in bound instead of applied tariff rates. The tariff overhang estimates remain also stable when excluding bound tariff transition periods after the Uruguay Round or subsequent to new member accessions. These results are available upon request.

‘TP Retaliation, 2-digit’ takes the value one if at least one exporting country initiated an investigation against the importer at hand in the same 2-digit sector in the previous year, and zero otherwise. Using the 2-digit definition, the estimation results indicate that retaliation concerns at a relatively broad level play no significant role for the initiation of TP proceedings. The estimates for the tariff overhang variable and the remaining regressors resemble almost one-to-one the results of the baseline specification in column (2) of [Table 3](#).

However, the 2-digit measure might be too crude to identify retaliatory motives as countries specify targeted sectors most of the time at least at the 6-digit level. Column (32) therefore replaces the broad 2-digit with a more targeted 6-digit retaliation measure. Specifically, the ‘TP Retaliation, 6-digit’ dummy takes the value one if at least one exporting country initiated a TP investigation against the importer in the same 6-digit sector in the previous year, and zero otherwise. When using this much more detailed measure, the retaliation coefficient increases substantially in magnitude and now exerts a significant effect (at the one percent level). Thus, consistent with the findings in [Tabakis and Zanardi \(2017a\)](#), countries are more like to invoke TP measures in sectors in which domestic exporters have recently faced sanctions abroad. To further investigate this channel, column (33) distinguishes between retaliatory 6-digit level AD, CVD and SG investigations abroad. The results indicate that the significant retaliation effect in specification (32) is driven by AD and SG sanctions which domestic exporters face in other countries. Foreign CVD investigations invoke no significant response, although the estimate is still positive.

Focusing mostly on the US context, a number of studies examine industry-specific characteristics and their impact on the initiation of TP proceedings. Industries with better political connections and worse performance are thought to be more likely to seek temporary protection. As no consistent industry-specific information on output and political leverage are available for the sample of countries at hand, I rely on the incidence of past TP investigations as the next best proxy of an industry’s sway on policy makers. Specifically, column (34) introduces the dummy ‘TP Past, 3 years’, which takes the value one if a TP investigation was initiated by the importer in the previous three years in the same 6-digit sector. Two results emerge. First, the initiation of TP proceedings in the recent past is indeed a significant positive predictor of TP investigations in the present. Second, while the magnitude of the coefficient slightly decreases, the tariff overhang variable retains its significant negative impact on TP procedures. Thus, even after controlling for past sectoral protectionist demands, which can proxy for political clout and performance issues, tariff overhangs and temporary protection measures remain substitutes.

Finally, to examine the robustness of the tariff overhang results, specification (35) includes all additional TP determinants simultaneously: import growth, the inverse import demand elasticity, tariff adjustments, aggregate 6-digit retaliation concerns, and recent TP procedures. The results show that the negative and significant impact of tariff overhangs on the probability of TP investigations is preserved. The magnitude of the average marginal effect is even slightly greater than in the baseline results in column 2 of Table 3. Moreover, the estimates for all other variables are similar to the previous specifications in Table 6. Hence, the empirical evidence from the logit regressions in Table 6, which include a host of additional TP determinants, confirms the earlier findings. Tariff overhangs function as a substitute for TP measures. Of the additional control variables, retaliatory motives, past TP initiation patterns, the level of imports and the share in world imports also turn out to be consistent significant predictors of TP proceedings.

5.3 Temporary Protection Tariffs

The analysis so far considered as dependent variable the initiation of temporary protection investigations by importing countries. This measure is an appropriate indicator for sectoral protectionist pressures as long as governments only take up investigations that have a reasonable chance to result in the application of additional tariffs. The data supports this point as 4,522 out of 6,163 investigations in the sample, or 73 percent, eventually result in a temporary protection tariff. It could be argued, however, that the sectoral incidence of actually implemented TP tariffs is a more appropriate measure of protectionist tradeoffs that governments face. To examine this possibility, Table 7 employs as dependent variable a binary measure which takes the value one if country c initiates the application of a temporary protection tariff in sector i in year t . Table 7 follows the same format of Table 6. Columns (36) to (42) separately consider the previously specified additional TP determinants, while specification (43) accounts for all variables simultaneously. One difference to Table 6 is that the past TP investigations dummy (Past TP, 3 years) is now replaced with a binary variable (Past TP Tariff, 3 years) that takes the value one if the country imposed a new TP tariff in the same sector in the previous three years, and zero otherwise.

Three interesting results emerge from the logit average marginal effect estimates in Table 7. First, as in Table 6, tariff overhangs have a highly significant negative effect on the application of sectoral TP tariffs throughout, independent of the included controls. Second, both retaliatory motives and past sectoral TP activities retain their positive and significant impact on the incidence of temporary protection tariffs. The former result is again driven by AD and SG investigations

abroad (see column (41)). Third, compared to [Table 6](#), two additional variables are significant drivers of TP tariffs: 3-year import growth and the 3-year change in the applied tariff rate. In particular, specifications (36) and (43) show that import growth is negatively associated with the incidence of a TP tariff. This result might seem surprising as the ‘managed trade’ literature links import surges to temporary protection. However, as previously discussed, an increase in imports could also be induced by a positive domestic demand shock. In that case, a rise in imports decreases the likelihood of additional protectionist demands by domestic actors.

At the same time, specifications (38) and (43) indicate that sectors which face protectionist pressure by domestic constituents, as reflected by recent applied MFN tariff increases, are more likely to eventually also feature a TP tariff. As applied tariffs can only be raised up to the bound rate, continuing demands for protection eventually result in a TP tariff in the presence of a small overhang. This result is further evidence for a substitution effect between tariff overhangs and TP measures, independent of the fact whether one focuses on the initiation of investigations or the application of actual additional tariffs as dependent variable.

5.4 Count Data Models

Focusing on a binary dependent variable when examining the determinants of TP proceedings could discard useful variation in the data. That is, if multiple TP investigations take place within a given 6-digit HS sector, a binary coding for the dependent variable might understate the true degree of protectionism. This part therefore employs count data models to examine whether the above results are sensitive to this choice. In particular, I will use a negative binomial regression framework, which is particularly attractive in the present context as it can account for the potential overdispersion in the number of TP actions in specific sectors.

In a first step, specifications (44) and (45) in [Table 8](#) differentiate between the number of distinct TP measures that are simultaneously applied in a given sector. Specifically, the dependent variable, ‘TP Type Count’, now ranges from zero to three, where the numerical value reflects how many different types of TP investigations are simultaneously initiated in a sector. A zero indicates no initiated TP action in a given 6-digit HS sector while counts of one, two and three reflect how many distinct types of investigations have been triggered out of the three possible options: AD, CVD, SG. Column (44) presents average marginal effect estimates for the baseline specification which includes the tariff overhang measure, the log of sectoral imports, the PTA import share, and the world import share (in logs). As before, all specifications in [Table 8](#) also account for country-year and 2-digit

sector fixed effects. When applying the negative binomial model, the effect of tariff overhangs on the likelihood of TP investigations is again negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. Moreover, the magnitude of the tariff overhang coefficient is comparable to the baseline logit specification in column (2) of [Table 3](#). The results for the remaining control variables also closely resemble the prior findings. Column (45) introduces again all additional TP determinants from the previous section. As in [Table 6](#), only the measures that account for retaliation concerns and past TP investigations have a persistent positive effect. More importantly, we can conclude that tariff overhangs are inversely linked to the number of distinct TP types that are invoked in a given 6-digit sector, even after controlling for a host of other factors.

However, many TP measures are applied below the 6-digit HS level and thus the count variable used above might still mask some of the existing heterogeneity across sectors. As previously discussed, the TTBD database frequently lists products under investigation at the 8- or even 10-digit HS level. Specifications (46) and (47) in [Table 8](#) therefore disaggregate the number of initiated TP proceedings even further. The dependent variable now consists of the count of actual products within a given 6-digit HS sector that are subject to a newly initiated investigation ('TP Product Count'), counting all AD, CVD and SG measures below the 6-digit level.²³ Three results emerge when considering the baseline negative binomial regression in column (46). First, the tariff overhang estimate remains negative and significant at the one percent level. Second, the positive impact of $\log(\text{Imports})$ and the negative effect of $\log(\text{WorldImportShare})$ mirror the earlier findings. Both estimates are significant at the one percent level. Interestingly, with the more detailed count measure, we now also detect a negative and significant effect (at the one percent level) for the PTAImportShare variable. That is, a greater share of imports that is accounted for by PTA partners lowers the number of initiated TP investigations at the 8- and 10-digit HS levels. Third, compared to the previous specifications, the magnitude of the average marginal effects increases for all variables, including tariff overhangs. This result is most likely due to the increase in the mean and range of the dependent variable, raising in turn the coefficient estimates compared to the specifications that considered the more conservative count measure in columns (44) and (45) or the binary indicator in the logit/LPM regressions. Introducing the previously suggested determinants of TP investigations in specification (47) does not change these conclusions. Both retaliatory motives and past TP investigations exert again positive and significant effects on the count of TP products under investigation. As in some of the previous specifications, changes in imports have a significant negative impact.

²³ On average, 4.3 8- or 10-digit HS codes are under investigation per 6-digit HS sector with initiated TP proceedings.

Another source of heterogeneity in the temporary protection context is the count of countries that are actually affected by a TP measure. This distinction is potentially important as, for instance, an antidumping investigation might target only one exporter while safeguard protections usually apply much more broadly. To distinguish between these cases, specifications (48) and (49) in [Table 8](#) use as dependent variable the count of countries that is affected by a TP investigation in a given 6-digit HS sector.²⁴ The negative significant estimates in both columns indicate that lower tariff overhangs result in TP measures that affect more exporters. That is, temporary protection is applied broadly in terms of country coverage if MFN tariff flexibility is more limited. With regard to the other TP determinants, the results in column (49) are qualitatively similar to the previous findings. Only import growth, changes in applied MFN tariffs, and the inverse import demand elasticity show no significant effects.

Overall, the estimates from the count data models in [Table 8](#) show that tariff overhangs do not only lower the probability of a TP investigation. Higher sectoral tariff overhangs also decrease the range of distinct types of TP measures that importers apply, lower the count of affected products and limit the number of exporters that are targeted. Moreover, the consistency of the estimates across three empirical frameworks —logit, linear probability and count data models— offers strong support for the hypothesis that sectoral tariff overhangs and TP measures function as substitutes for WTO member countries.

6 Concluding Remarks

The use of temporary protection measures in the form of antidumping, safeguard and countervailing duties has surged substantially among GATT/WTO members over the last three decades. The increased prevalence of targeted import protection raises concerns as some of the hard-wrought reductions in MFN tariffs of the past are in danger of being reversed. This paper addresses the question whether the negotiated MFN tariff structure itself is one of the crucial drivers for the initiation of TP proceedings. The idea that demands for protection and in particular changes in tariff rates are determinants of TP proceedings is not new. Much of the theoretical literature supports the notion that tariffs and TP measures are substitutes, but empirical studies only provide mixed evidence on the linkages between tariff cuts and the incidence of AD, SG and CVD investigations.

²⁴ In the sample, the mean number of affected countries by a TP investigation is 3.2. Note that in the case of safeguards the count is restricted to countries in the sample that exhibit positive exports in a given 6-digit sector.

I take a new approach in this paper and examine a key trade policy measure that was previously neglected in the literature on TP determinants: sectoral tariff overhangs, the difference between WTO bound and applied tariff rates. Countries should only be inclined to implement sectoral TP measures when they cannot adjust their MFN applied rate without legal repercussions, i.e. in the case of a low tariff overhang, independent of past tariff reductions. I test this hypothesis using detailed sectoral data for 30 WTO member countries over the period 1996-2014. The empirical analysis provides strong evidence that tariff overhangs and TP measures are substitutes, while changes in tariffs have little or no effect. This result is robust to various estimation methods, subsample selection, and the inclusion of other previously suggested determinants in addition to country-year and industry fixed effects. This paper therefore confirms what the theoretical literature has long suggested. The regulation of traditional tariff instruments leads to substitution effects toward TP measures (and potentially other non-tariff barriers). Moreover, the tariff overhang channel emerges as the key variable to capture this margin and allows us to determine which countries and sectors are more likely to become subject to TP investigations.

Given the existence of a substitution effect toward TP activities in the presence of low tariff overhangs, should the WTO attempt to further constrain the usage of AD, SG and CVD measures? The presence of these ‘safety valves’ is not necessarily a detrimental component of a trade agreement if they facilitate in turn a push toward deeper cooperation on trade issues. However, WTO members need to strike a sensible balance between demands for trade policy flexibility and the restrictiveness of conditions that govern the application of TP measures. In practice, TP investigations are frequently criticized to show bias against foreign exporters due to unclear decision criteria and debatable tariff margin calculations ([Blonigen and Prusa 2016](#)). In many TP cases, imports also simply shift from one foreign supplier to another, implying much lower benefits for domestic firms than usually anticipated ([Irwin 2015](#)). From this perspective, the current treatment of TP measures in the international trading system is a costly and ineffective way to broker trade policy concessions.

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
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Figure 1: Share of 6-digit Sectors with TP Activity, by Tariff Overhang



Notes: Author's own calculations based on data for the baseline sample from the TTBD and TRAINS databases. Figure 1 shows the share (in percent) of 6-digit HS sectors that are subject to a new temporary protection investigation in the subsequent year, sorted by tariff overhang categories.

Table 1: Temporary Protection Measures and Tariff Overhang Distribution by Country, 6-digit HS level, 1996–2014

Country	Observations	Total TP	AD	SG	CVD	Share of Sectors by Tariff Overhang			
						≤ 0%	0 – 20%	20 – 40%	> 40%
Argentina	80,439	432	374	55	3	0.028	0.568	0.404	0.000
Australia	77,294	190	179	9	36	0.251	0.691	0.051	0.006
Brazil	82,876	266	240	17	27	0.035	0.631	0.324	0.010
Canada	87,431	282	229	53	87	0.538	0.462	0.000	0.000
Chile	55,649	127	22	103	7	0.000	0.988	0.012	0.001
China	49,910	183	107	84	10	0.924	0.076	0.001	0.000
Colombia	72,425	222	114	108	0	0.021	0.156	0.724	0.099
Costa Rica	39,993	13	7	4	2	0.026	0.053	0.410	0.510
Ecuador	31,439	260	5	255	0	0.117	0.808	0.074	0.001
European Union	86,414	565	449	97	115	0.941	0.059	0.000	0.000
India	49,948	804	662	155	2	0.183	0.347	0.359	0.110
Indonesia	78,506	185	99	86	0	0.042	0.126	0.701	0.132
Israel	23,355	41	41	0	0	0.223	0.624	0.077	0.076
Jamaica	12,596	5	5	1	0	0.008	0.139	0.288	0.565
Japan	22,324	9	4	3	2	0.960	0.040	0.000	0.000
Malaysia	36,336	22	21	1	0	0.250	0.621	0.124	0.005
Mexico	85,781	169	156	10	5	0.052	0.279	0.660	0.009
New Zealand	50,295	41	41	0	0	0.405	0.522	0.073	0.000
Pakistan	35,593	65	63	2	8	0.115	0.051	0.060	0.774
Paraguay	6,753	2	2	0	0	0.022	0.450	0.528	0.000
Peru	65,820	858	437	411	11	0.023	0.593	0.380	0.003
Philippines	13,276	13	5	8	0	0.043	0.653	0.272	0.033
South Africa	65,455	88	85	3	9	0.235	0.640	0.097	0.028
South Korea	68,935	121	121	0	0	0.414	0.516	0.064	0.007
Thailand	22,472	67	58	9	0	0.269	0.343	0.383	0.006
Trinidad and Tobago	4,996	8	8	0	0	0.015	0.025	0.208	0.752
Turkey	35,746	133	89	44	1	0.145	0.604	0.207	0.045
USA	83,235	805	644	191	388	0.982	0.018	0.000	0.000
Uruguay	11,480	11	11	0	0	0.007	0.624	0.367	0.003
Venezuela	29,984	176	55	120	2	0.007	0.340	0.622	0.031

Notes: The sum of AD, SG and CVD does not equal the total TP measure count if different kinds of TP measures are simultaneously applied in the same 6-digit HS sector.

Table 2: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Obs.	Definition	Source
AD	0.0032	0.0561	1,370,278	AD investigation (Yes: 1, No: 0)	TTBD database
AD Retaliation, 6-digit	0.0032	0.0565	1,466,756	Country under AD investigation in same 6-digit sector (Yes: 1, No: 0)	TTBD database
CVD Retaliation, 6-digit	0.0005	0.0223	1,466,756	Country under CVD investigation in same 6-digit sector (Yes: 1, No: 0)	TTBD database
Δ AppliedTariff, 3 years	-0.0104	0.0448	1,078,941	3-year change in sectoral applied tariff (in ad valorem terms)	WITS database
CVD	0.0022	0.0467	327,804	CVD investigation (Yes: 1, No: 0)	TTBD database
1/[Import Demand Elasticity]	0.7951	0.3981	1,395,483	Sectoral inverse import demand elasticity	Broda et al. (2008) & Kee et al. (2008)
log(Imports)	7.3500	2.9889	1,466,756	log of sectoral imports (in \$1,000s)	UN Comtrade
Δ log(Imports), 3 years	0.2141	1.2250	1,340,832	3-year change in log(Imports)	UN Comtrade
log(WorldImportShare)	-5.2614	2.4373	1,466,756	log of sectoral world import share	UN Comtrade
Overhang	0.1430	0.1747	1,466,756	MFN bound tariff – MFN applied tariff (in ad valorem terms)	WITS database
Past TP, 3 years	0.0111	0.1046	1,466,756	TP investigation in same 6-digit sector in last 3 years (Yes: 1, No: 0)	TTBD database
PTAImportShare	0.3040	0.3601	1,466,756	Share of sectoral imports from PTA partners	UN Comtrade & de Sousa (2012)
SG	0.0055	0.0739	333,002	SG investigation (Yes: 1, No: 0)	TTBD database
SG Retaliation, 6-digit	0.0154	0.1231	1,466,756	Country under SG investigation in same 6-digit sector (Yes: 1, No: 0)	TTBD database
TP	0.0042	0.0647	1,466,756	TP investigation (Yes: 1, No: 0)	TTBD database
TP Affected Country Count	0.0132	0.2963	1,466,756	Number of countries under TP investigation in 6-digit sector	TTBD database
TP Product HS Count	0.0179	0.9798	1,466,756	Number of products under TP investigation in 6-digit sector	TTBD database
TP Retaliation, 2-digit	0.2630	0.4403	1,466,756	Country under TP investigation in same 2-digit sector (Yes: 1, No: 0)	TTBD database
TP Retaliation, 6-digit	0.0182	0.1338	1,466,756	Country under TP investigation in same 6-digit sector (Yes: 1, No: 0)	TTBD database
TP Type Count	0.0047	0.0754	1,466,756	TP investigation type count in 6-digit sector (AD+CVD+SG)	TTBD database

Table 3: Temporary Protection Measures and Tariff Overhangs – Logit Model Results (Average Marginal Effects)

Dependent Variable: Temporary Protection Measure (1: Yes, 0: No)	6-digit (1) TP	6-digit (2) TP	6-digit (3) TP	6-digit (4) TP	6-digit (5) AD	6-digit (6) CVD	6-digit (7) SG	2-digit (8) TP	4-digit (9) TP
Overhang _{t-1}	-0.0059*** (0.0022)	-0.0064*** (0.0023)	-0.0067*** (0.0023)	-0.0070** (0.0031)	-0.0056*** (0.0014)	-0.0042* (0.0022)	-0.0051 (0.0086)	-0.0452*** (0.0151)	-0.0075*** (0.0024)
log(Imports) _{t-1}		0.0014*** (0.0001)		0.0014*** (0.0001)	0.0012*** (0.0001)	0.0010*** (0.0001)	0.0010*** (0.0002)	-0.0013 (0.0103)	0.0041*** (0.0002)
PTAImportShare _{t-1}		0.0002 (0.0006)	0.0005 (0.0005)	0.0000 (0.0006)	-0.0001 (0.0006)	-0.0016*** (0.0005)	0.0012 (0.0008)	-0.0101 (0.0121)	-0.0000 (0.0011)
log(WorldImportShare) _{t-1}		-0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0010*** (0.0001)	-0.0004*** (0.0001)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.0003** (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0212** (0.0104)	-0.0012*** (0.0003)
Overhang _{t-1} ×PTAImportShare _{t-1}				0.0015 (0.0031)					
Observations	1,466,756	1,466,756	1,466,756	1,466,756	1,370,278	327,804	333,002	22,423	368,589
Pseudo R2	0.207	0.236	0.218	0.236	0.194	0.226	0.375	0.287	0.208
Country-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2-digit HS FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table presents average marginal effects from logit model regressions. Clustered standard errors at the country/2-digit HS level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.

Table 4: Temporary Protection Measures and Tariff Overhangs – Linear Probability Model Results

Dependent Variable: Temporary Protection Measure (1: Yes, 0: No)	6-digit (10) TP	6-digit (11) TP	6-digit (12) TP	6-digit (13) TP	6-digit (14) AD	6-digit (15) CVD	6-digit (16) SG	2-digit (17) TP	4-digit (18) TP	6-digit (19) TP
Overhang _{t-1}	-0.0044*** (0.0016)	-0.0044*** (0.0016)	-0.0047*** (0.0016)	-0.0049** (0.0020)	-0.0038*** (0.0010)	-0.0033* (0.0019)	-0.0027 (0.0039)	-0.0346*** (0.0115)	-0.0065*** (0.0017)	-0.0030*** (0.0011)
log(Imports) _{t-1}		0.0013*** (0.0001)		0.0013*** (0.0001)	0.0011*** (0.0001)	0.0008*** (0.0001)	0.0009*** (0.0002)	-0.0007 (0.0080)	0.0032*** (0.0002)	0.0009*** (0.0001)
PTAImportShare _{t-1}		0.0004 (0.0006)	0.0007 (0.0006)	0.0002 (0.0007)	-0.0001 (0.0006)	-0.0013** (0.0006)	0.0021** (0.0009)	-0.0063 (0.0080)	-0.0002 (0.0009)	0.0001 (0.0004)
log(WorldImportShare) _{t-1}		-0.0005*** (0.0001)	0.0009*** (0.0001)	-0.0005*** (0.0001)	-0.0005*** (0.0001)	-0.0004*** (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0002)	0.0104 (0.0080)	-0.0014*** (0.0002)	-0.0004*** (0.0001)
Overhang _{t-1} ×PTAImportShare _{t-1}				0.0019 (0.0022)						
Observations	1,466,756	1,466,756	1,466,756	1,466,756	1,370,278	327,804	333,002	22,423	368,589	2,168,827
R2	0.0199	0.0213	0.0204	0.0213	0.0125	0.0102	0.0435	0.1526	0.0221	0.0195
Country-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2-digit HS FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table presents linear probability model regression results. Clustered standard errors at the country/2-digit HS level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.

Table 5: Temporary Protection Measures and Tariff Overhangs – Subsample Results

Sample Restriction	Logit Model				Linear Probability Model			
	TP>25	TP>75	TP>150	TP<500	TP>25	TP>75	TP>150	TP<500
Dependent Variable:	6-digit	6-digit	6-digit	6-digit	6-digit	6-digit	6-digit	6-digit
Temporary Protection Measure	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)
(1: Yes, 0: No)	TP	TP	TP	TP	TP	TP	TP	TP
Overhang _{t-1}	-0.0071*** (0.0026)	-0.0083*** (0.0030)	-0.0119*** (0.0046)	-0.0031*** (0.0009)	-0.0046*** (0.0018)	-0.0062*** (0.0023)	-0.0076*** (0.0029)	-0.0025*** (0.0009)
log(Imports) _{t-1}	0.0015*** (0.0001)	0.0016*** (0.0001)	0.0018*** (0.0002)	0.0011*** (0.0001)	0.0014*** (0.0001)	0.0015*** (0.0001)	0.0017*** (0.0001)	0.0010*** (0.0001)
PTAImportShare _{t-1}	0.0002 (0.0006)	0.0002 (0.0007)	0.0003 (0.0008)	-0.0003 (0.0004)	0.0006 (0.0007)	0.0008 (0.0008)	0.0008 (0.0009)	0.0001 (0.0004)
log(WorldImportShare) _{t-1}	-0.0004*** (0.0001)	-0.0005*** (0.0001)	-0.0005*** (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.0005*** (0.0001)	-0.0005*** (0.0001)	-0.0006*** (0.0001)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)
Observations	1,316,909	1,185,367	960,014	1,147,965	1,316,909	1,185,367	960,014	1,147,965
R2 (Pseudo R2)	0.230	0.228	0.232	0.215	0.0218	0.0223	0.0246	0.0131
Country-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2-digit HS FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Columns (20)–(23) in the table present average marginal effects from logit model regressions and columns (24)–(27) show linear probability model regression results. Clustered standard errors at the country/2-digit HS level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.

Table 6: Temporary Protection Measures and Tariff Overhangs – Additional Determinants (Logit Model Results)

Dependent Variable: Temporary Protection Measure (1: Yes, 0: No)	6-digit (28) TP	6-digit (29) TP	6-digit (30) TP	6-digit (31) TP	6-digit (32) TP	6-digit (33) TP	6-digit (34) TP	6-digit (35) TP
Overhang _{t-1}	-0.0070*** (0.0023)	-0.0069*** (0.0025)	-0.0074*** (0.0020)	-0.0064*** (0.0023)	-0.0062*** (0.0023)	-0.0062*** (0.0023)	-0.0054** (0.0021)	-0.0073*** (0.0021)
$\Delta \log(\text{Imports})_{t-1}$, 3 years	-0.0001 (0.0001)							0.0000 (0.0001)
1/[Import Demand Elasticity]		-0.0004 (0.0002)						-0.0001 (0.0002)
$\Delta \text{AppliedTariff}_{t-1}$, 3 years			0.0007 (0.0029)					-0.0019 (0.0032)
TP Retaliation _{t-1} , 2-digit				0.0007 (0.0005)				
TP Retaliation _{t-1} , 6-digit					0.0043*** (0.0007)			0.0036*** (0.0009)
AD Retaliation _{t-1} , 6-digit						0.0038*** (0.0009)		
CVD Retaliation _{t-1} , 6-digit						0.0003 (0.0013)		
SG Retaliation _{t-1} , 6-digit						0.0041*** (0.0008)		
Past TP _{t-1} , 3 years							0.0072*** (0.0005)	0.0075*** (0.0007)
$\log(\text{Imports})_{t-1}$	0.0014*** (0.0001)	0.0014*** (0.0001)	0.0014*** (0.0001)	0.0014*** (0.0001)	0.0014*** (0.0001)	0.0014*** (0.0001)	0.0012*** (0.0001)	0.0012*** (0.0001)
PTAImportShare _{t-1}	0.0003 (0.0006)	0.0003 (0.0006)	0.0002 (0.0006)	0.0002 (0.0006)	0.0002 (0.0006)	0.0002 (0.0006)	0.0002 (0.0005)	0.0003 (0.0006)
$\log(\text{WorldImportShare})_{t-1}$	-0.0004*** (0.0001)	-0.0004*** (0.0001)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.0004*** (0.0001)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.0002** (0.0001)
Observations	1,340,832	1,395,483	1,078,941	1,466,756	1,466,756	1,466,756	1,466,756	1,014,083
Pseudo R2	0.233	0.235	0.242	0.236	0.241	0.241	0.256	0.271
Country-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2-digit HS FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table presents average marginal effects from logit model regressions. Clustered standard errors at the country/2-digit HS level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.

Table 7: Temporary Protection Tariffs and Tariff Overhangs (Logit Model Results)

Dependent Variable:	6-digit	6-digit	6-digit	6-digit	6-digit	6-digit	6-digit	6-digit
Temporary Protection Tariff	(36)	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)	(43)
(1: Yes, 0: No)	TP	TP	TP	TP	TP	TP	TP	TP
Overhang _{t-1}	-0.0078*** (0.0022)	-0.0076*** (0.0020)	-0.0052*** (0.0016)	-0.0074*** (0.0019)	-0.0072*** (0.0019)	-0.0072*** (0.0019)	-0.0064*** (0.0017)	-0.0049*** (0.0016)
$\Delta \log(\text{Imports})_{t-1}$, 3 years	-0.0004*** (0.0001)							-0.0003** (0.0001)
1/[Import Demand Elasticity]		-0.0002 (0.0002)						-0.0000 (0.0002)
$\Delta \text{AppliedTariff}_{t-1}$, 3 years			0.0072*** (0.0021)					0.0063*** (0.0022)
TP Retaliation _{t-1} , 2-digit				0.0008 (0.0005)				
TP Retaliation _{t-1} , 6-digit					0.0033*** (0.0007)			0.0032*** (0.0008)
AD Retaliation _{t-1} , 6-digit						0.0020** (0.0010)		
CVD Retaliation _{t-1} , 6-digit						-0.0006 (0.0024)		
SG Retaliation _{t-1} , 6-digit						0.0036*** (0.0007)		
Past TP Tariff _{t-1} , 3 years							0.0068*** (0.0005)	0.0067*** (0.0006)
$\log(\text{Imports})_{t-1}$	0.0013*** (0.0001)	0.0013*** (0.0001)	0.0012*** (0.0001)	0.0012*** (0.0001)	0.0012*** (0.0001)	0.0012*** (0.0001)	0.0011*** (0.0001)	0.0010*** (0.0001)
PTAImportShare _{t-1}	-0.0001 (0.0005)	-0.0001 (0.0005)	-0.0002 (0.0005)	-0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.0002 (0.0004)	-0.0002 (0.0004)	-0.0003 (0.0004)	-0.0004 (0.0005)
$\log(\text{WorldImportShare})_{t-1}$	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.0004*** (0.0001)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.0004*** (0.0001)	-0.0004*** (0.0001)	-0.0004*** (0.0001)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.0002 (0.0001)
Observations	1,153,127	1,192,211	935,088	1,252,042	1,252,042	1,252,042	1,252,042	879,848
Pseudo R2	0.226	0.226	0.226	0.228	0.231	0.232	0.252	0.255
Country-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2-digit HS FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table presents average marginal effects from logit model regressions. Clustered standard errors at the country/2-digit HS level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.

Table 8: Temporary Protection and Tariff Overhangs – Negative Binomial Model Results

Dependent Variable: Temporary Protection Measure Count	TP Type Count		TP Product Count		TP Affected Country Count	
	(44)	(45)	(46)	(47)	(48)	(49)
Overhang _{t-1}	-0.0074*** (0.0027)	-0.0080*** (0.0021)	-0.0323*** (0.0089)	-0.0323*** (0.0101)	-0.0211*** (0.0066)	-0.0521** (0.0229)
$\Delta \log(\text{Imports})_{t-1}$, 3 years		0.0000 (0.0001)		-0.0009* (0.0005)		-0.0018 (0.0011)
1/[Import Demand Elasticity]		-0.0002 (0.0002)		0.0016 (0.0013)		-0.0028 (0.0025)
$\Delta \text{AppliedTariff}_{t-1}$		-0.0021 (0.0035)		-0.0280 (0.0178)		-0.0686 (0.0448)
TP Retaliation _{t-1} , 6-digit		0.0043*** (0.0008)		0.0177*** (0.0031)		0.0442*** (0.0144)
Past TP _{t-1} , 3 years		0.0080*** (0.0008)		0.0435*** (0.0083)		0.0861*** (0.0284)
$\log(\text{Imports})_{t-1}$	0.0018*** (0.0001)	0.0015*** (0.0002)	0.0113*** (0.0017)	0.0097*** (0.0015)	0.0091*** (0.0014)	0.0179*** (0.0056)
PTAImportShare _{t-1}	-0.0002 (0.0006)	0.0002 (0.0007)	-0.0074*** (0.0028)	-0.0052** (0.0026)	-0.0048** (0.0022)	-0.0169** (0.0077)
$\log(\text{WorldImportShare})_{t-1}$	-0.0005*** (0.0001)	-0.0003** (0.0001)	-0.0042*** (0.0009)	-0.0031*** (0.0009)	-0.0023*** (0.0006)	-0.0022* (0.0013)
Observations	1,466,756	1,014,083	1,466,756	1,014,083	1,466,756	879,848
Pseudo R2	0.210	0.243	0.163	0.167	0.160	0.163
Country-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2-digit HS FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table presents average marginal effects from negative binomial model regressions. Clustered standard errors at the country/2-digit HS level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.